I’ve just returned from a workshop in Switzerland that I was really excited to be a part of: “The costs and benefits of information acquisition and use in social interactions”, organised by Michael Taborsky and Leif Engqvist from the University of Bern. We had 8 excellent speakers, with plenty of time between for group discussions (and four-course Swiss meals) looking out over the imposing north face of Mont Collon (3,637m!). I was really keen to be involved in this workshop as it really tied together my previous work (focusing on adaptive functions of certain types of social interactions in a cooperative species) with what I’m looking at now and moving more towards: how individuals use information about their environment and social groups. Michael’s work on how individuals respond to social information in cichlid groups has been a big influence on how I’ve thought about cooperation, so I was also very motivated to meet and hear more from him.
The focus of the workshop was on social information, but given the broad interests of the speakers, we heard and talked about a variety of topics around this theme, from cognition’s role in group-living, to plasticity in information use. I’ll summarise what I took from the talks, and give a brief overview of the key messages or questions that we took away from the workshop as a whole.
Michael started by asking what information individuals use when making decisions, and introduced Lloyd Morgan’s idea of parsimony in this context: i.e. behaviour should be interpreted as having used the most simple rules, and the lowest order of information. How true is this in the case of animal decision-making? He gave us some lovely examples from his own work on Norway rats highlighting the more complex information rats use when deciding whether to help a partner (by pulling a lever that gives the partner a food item), and the importance of context, something we came back to again and again over the course of the workshop. For example, rats pull the lever quicker to help out a partner if that partner had previously given them a high quality food item, relative to partners that had provided the focal individual with a lower quality item (Dolivo & Taborsky 2015).
Jens Krause (Humboldt University, Berlin) then spoke about decision making in the context of collective behaviour and movement. He’s been doing some neat experiments with robotic fish to test how an individual’s behaviour within a group can alter the behaviour of others (Landgraf et al. 2013).
If one individual moves in a direction that’s counterintuitive, for example, will other individuals forego their own personal information to follow them on the basis of social information? He also introduced a new concept to me: the “quorum threshold”, the proportion of a group that “decides” for an individual, i.e. an individual’s likelihood of choosing an option is based on whether X% of a group are already committed to that option (leave patch, for example) (Sumpter & Pratt 2009).
Below is a TED talk that Jens did at Ghent on group movement and swarm intelligence…
Sasha Dall from the University of Exeter asked a question that then came up in almost every subsequent discussion – what do we mean when we talk about information? (Dall et al. 2005.) He argues that the details we pick up about our environment is NOT information, but ‘data’ – information is what is derived from that data that reduces our uncertainty about the world – and that we should discriminate between content vs mechanism. For example, the news may provide information but is not inherently informative – it is a ‘channel’. (Interestingly, it seems that the problem of distinguishing data from information may be partly due to the fact that we don’t have a distinct word for what Sasha terms ‘data’ – Michael pointed out in group discussion that in German, the word informationen is analogous to ‘data’ in this sense, and is different from informatione which in this case is analagous to meaningful information).
Straying a little into my particular interest in information use – in the context of plasticity – Dave Stephens from the University of Minnesota spoke about the model he’s developed to derive predictions about how individuals should respond to personal information and other signals from the environment (McLinn & Stephens 2006).
For example, if an animal’s experience with choice A is good, when would it pay to ignore that experience and trust a signal about which choice is better? (See figure). Dave has tested this model empirically with blue jays and Drosophila. Using the latter, he’s shown that some types of environmental change (i.e. when individuals must use experience to inform decisions, rather than rely on innate preferences) can promote the evolution of learning by allowing flies to lay eggs on media of two different flavours with fitness consequences (only eggs on one flavour allowed to survive), and using quinine on one medium as a signal that could be learned (Dunlap & Stephens 2009). Fascinating stuff! A lovely example of combining theory and experimental work that really got me inspired…
Sarah Brosnan from Georgia State works with captive primates to test theories about reciprocity, decision-making and inequity. Particularly striking in her talk were examples of individuals reacting to receiving a poorer reward than a partner for completing the same task, showing clearly that animals have a sense of fairness…
… something that was also shown beautifully by Keith Jensen from Manchester University, who has been looking at what he calls “Other-regarding concerns”; a potentially uniquely human psychological mechanism allowing us to care about the welfare of others? (Jensen et al. 2014). He’s done some experiments that really blew me away, testing (separately) how children (aged 3 and 5) and chimps react to witnessing the food of one individual being stolen by another. Would the focal child/chimp punish the thief even if they didn’t lose anything from this interaction themselves? Chimps didn’t (Riedl et al. 2012) – but kids overwhelmingly did (Riedl et al. 2015)! Could this concern for social norms and fairness (even when fairness doesn’t involve the first party) be what makes human so uniquely prosocial?
Moving back to theory, we also heard about some models of cooperation that Leif Engqvist is developing at Bern (as yet unpublished I think, so I won’t go into details), and from Jeff Stevens who joined us on Skype from Nebraska. Jeff has been doing some neat game theory-type experiments with human subjects to test the cognitive constraints on cooperative models like direct reciprocity (whereby you help an individual that has previously helped you) and has found that errors are common when people are asked to recall the behaviour (cooperation or defection) of previous partners, and increase with the number of interacting partners (Stevens et al. 2011). People were more likely to remember rare-type behaviours (i.e. when defecting is rare, remembered these partners better over varying retention intervals), possibly a mechanism by which cheating is discouraged and cooperation is maintained (Volstorf et al. 2011)?
Lastly, we had a brilliant talk by Thomas Bugnyar from the University of Vienna on his work looking at how learning behaviour in corvids influences and is influenced by social structure. I am a huge fan of Thomas’ work, as it really integrates the field of cognition with evolution by looking not just at what corvids are capable of learning and retaining, but how this might drive evolution of traits, and social systems! He’s shown through some beautifully simple experiments that ravens pass on information about things they’ve observed horizontally AND vertically (i.e. transgenerational transfer of info) and that they are attuned to third-party relations such as change of dominance within and outside their social group (Massen et al. 2014). Here’s a lovely Q&A with Thomas in Current Biology: he’s one of them most enthusiastic and interested people I’ve met! He’s also organising next year’s European Congress for Behavioural Biology in Vienna, which will be an excellent conference (great speaker line up already!).
These brilliant talks gave us lots to talk about in our group discussion sessions. Here are the main themes that struck me as important in these few days – I’d love to hear anyone’s thoughts on them!
- again and again we came back to the question of – what do we mean by “information”? At times it seemed that the argument was semantic, but the more we went round in circles the more it seemed important to think about this question carefully and clarify our definitions. I’d come up against this problem before without really taking it further when discussing with my students – if a signal is dishonest does it provide information? I actually heard about the idea of Shannon entropy for the first time – worth reading about if thinking about social systems, information, and its reproductive value in this context. This seemed a useful summary of these issues (from Information Theory Workshop, 2004. IEEE, DOI:10.1109/ITW.2004.1405273
- should individuals always use the highest order of information available? We developed this question/idea by conceiving a situation in which there were no costs of information acquisition – would there be any circumstances then under which some information could be ignored? There was a lot of discussion here about social context and how that might influence the benefits of obtaining more information relative to the costs of time delay or information retention.
- when might it be adaptive to ignore information? This question fed into the previous in getting us thinking about social context and costs/benefits… but was also interesting to consider in terms of Dave’s flag model which predicts that certainty of experience might over-ride the usefulness of potentially unreliable signals.
Finally – the CUSO (Conférence universitaire de Suisse occidentale – a consortium of Swiss universities including Neuchatel, Lausanne and Bern) organises workshops like these every year. I would HIGHLY recommend them – this was an excellent way of meeting other young scientists and established researchers in a friendly, discursive setting.
We finished off with a hike along the jaw-droppingly beautiful valley – perfect!
Dall et al. 2005. Information and its use by animals in evolutionary ecology. TREE 20(4): 187-193.
Dolivo, V & Taborsky M. 2015. Norway rats reciprocate help according to the quality of help they received.
Dunlap, A. S. & D. W. Stephens. 2009. Components of change in the evolution of learning and non-learning. Proceedings of the Royal Society (B) 276: 3201-3208.
Jensen et al. 2014. The emergence of human pro sociality: aligning with others through feelings, concerns, and norms. Frontiers in Psychology. Vol.5; article 822.